🇸🇦 Saudi Invoice MCP live

AI agents can now report and clear a Saudi tax invoice through ZATCA (Fatoora Phase 2). This remote MCP server forwards your already-signed UBL invoice to the government ZATCA gateway — report_invoice for simplified B2C invoices (reporting), clear_invoice for standard B2B invoices (clearance), and check_invoice_compliance for onboarding validation. It only wraps the submission calls: ECDSA signing and the ICV/PIH hash-chain stay merchant-side.

Connect

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "saudi-invoice": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://inv-sa.wishpool.app/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "x-zatca-csid-token": "your-csid-binarySecurityToken",
        "x-zatca-csid-secret": "your-csid-secret",
        "x-zatca-mode": "core"
      }
    }
  }
}

Get your CSID (token + secret) from ZATCA EGS onboarding. Omit x-zatca-mode to stay in the developer-portal sandbox (no fiscal effect); simulation = simulation env; core = production. Your ZATCA certificate and private key never leave your side — this server never sees them.

How it works

• You sign, we forward: you build + ECDSA-sign the UBL 2.1 invoice and compute its invoiceHash; you pass { invoiceHash, uuid, invoice(base64) }. This server relays it to ZATCA and translates the response — it never signs and never stores hash-chain state.
• Reporting vs clearance: simplified invoices (B2C) are reported after issuing; standard invoices (B2B) are cleared (ZATCA stamps them first) — clear_invoice returns the cleared XML in cleared_invoice.
• Mandatory ZATCA headers handled for you: Accept-Version: V2, Accept-Language: en, HTTP Basic auth from your CSID, and Clearance-Status: 1 on clearance calls.
• Status enums: results carry reporting_status (REPORTED / NOT_REPORTED), clearance_status (CLEARED / NOT_CLEARED), any warnings, and numbered next_steps.

Why it is safe

• Stateless: no database — your CSID token and secret travel per-request in headers and are never stored.
• Signing stays with you: the cryptographic chain (ECDSA signature, ICV counter, PIH previous-hash) is computed and kept merchant-side; a compromise here cannot forge or replay your invoices.
• Owner policy guardrails: x-agentpay-max-amount, x-agentpay-approval-above, x-agentpay-allowed-tools — set by the human owner in client config; the agent cannot relax them. The cap applies to the invoice grand total (TaxInclusiveAmount, SAR) when it can be read from the signed UBL.

Weak-model friendly

CSID taken from credential headers (never in the body); status enums spelled out in every tool description; ZATCA HTTP responses (200 cleared/reported, 202 accepted-with-warnings, 400/401 errors) passed through with numbered next_steps; every error teaches the fix (both credential headers, UUID format, base64 not raw XML, mode).

Sister servers

Invoices: Poland KSeF inv-pl · Mexico CFDI 4.0 inv-mx · Chile DTE inv-cl · Brazil NF-e inv-br · Peru CPE inv-pe · India GST inv-in. Local payments in 81 countries, one family, same stateless pattern: mcp.wishpool.app (Taiwan e-invoice 電子發票 included).